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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Albert R. Moore appeals from his conviction for felony driving under the
influence ("DUI").
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs
The state charged Moore with felony DUI. (R., pp. 19-20.) Prior to trial,
Moore submitted a motion in limine requesting a ruling on whether a prior DUI
conviction out of North Dakota was "substantially conforming" for purposes of
enhancing the present DUI to a felony. (R., pp. 34-37; Tr., p. 161, L. 19 - p. 173,
L. 24.) The court denied the motion, and ruled that the North Dakota law was
substantially conforming. (Tr., p. 173, L. 25 - p. 174, L. 2.) The case proceeded
to trial, and a jury found Moore guilty of DUI. (R., p. 51.)
In support of its allegation of prior convictions, the state submitted
judgments from Idaho and North Dakota showing prior convictions. (State's
Exhibits 3 & 4.) Moore objected to the admission of the North Dakota judgment
and an attached warrant for a probation violation. (Tr., p. 203, Ls. 5-24.) The
district court overruled the objection. (Tr., p. 204, L. 2 - p. 205, L. 6.) The jury
returned a guilty verdict on having two or more convictions in the last ten years.
(R., pp. 49-50.)
The district court entered a judgment of conviction and Moore timely
appealed. (R., pp. 56-61.)

ISSUES
Moore states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict
Mr. Moore of felony operating a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol?
2.
Did the district court err in admitting the North Dakota
judgment of conviction because it was not certified or
authenticated?

3.
Did the district court err in admitting the North Dakota bench
warrant because it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in concluding his
North Dakota conviction was "substantially conforming" to Idaho's DUI laws?
2.
Has Moore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting State's Exhibit 4, which contained a North Dakota judgment of
conviction and a warrant for arrest for a probation violation?

ARGUMENT
I.
Moore Has Failed To Show Error In The Conclusion That The North Dakota
Conviction Was Substantially Conforminq To ldaho DUI Law

A.

Introduction
Moore argues that his North Dakota conviction for DUI is not

"substantially conforming" because the North Dakota DUI statute has been
interpreted more broadly than Idaho's in relation to what constitutes' "physical
control" of a vehicle, whether the crime can be committed on private property,
and because a BAC test lower than what would bar prosecution in ldaho would
not bar prosecution in North Dakota. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14.) This argument
fails because it employs an incorrect legal standard. Application of the correct
legal standard - a comparison of Idaho's statute with North Dakota's -- shows
that the statutes are substantially conforming.
B.

Standard Of Review
"The determination of whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially

conforming is a question of law to be determined by the court." I.C. § 188005(8). The construction and application of a statute also presents a question
of law, over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Shock, 133
ldaho 753, 755, 992 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131
ldaho 484,485,959 P.2d 465,466 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Moore's Arqument Fails Because It Is Based On An Incorrect Statement
Of The Law
It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that the clearly

expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect, thus leaving no occasion
for construction where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous.

State

v. Scott, 135 ldaho 457,458-59, 19 P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001). The state
charged Moore pursuant to I.C.

18-8004, which defines the elements of DUI,

and 18-8005(5)', which provided that a DUI is a felony if the defendant has "two
(2) or more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho
Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any
combination thereof, within ten (10) years ...."

(See R., pp. 19-20.)

ldaho Code

18-8005(812 specifically defined "a substantially conforming foreign criminal
violation" for the purpose of I.C. § 18-8005(5) as follows:
For the purpose of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of [section
18-80051 and the provisions of section 18-8004C, ldaho Code, a
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation exists when a
person has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a violation of
any federal law or law of another state, or any valid county, city, or
town ordinance of another state substantially conforming to the
provisions of section 18-8004, ldaho Code. The determination of
whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially conforming is a
question of law to be determined by the court.
I.C. § 18-8005(8) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court determining whether
a foreign DUI conviction qualifies as "a substantially conforming foreign criminal
violation" must compare the provisions of the foreign law the defendant pled

' Currently I.C.
*Currently I.C.

18-8005(6).
18-8005(10).

guilty to or was found guilty of violating with the provisions of I.C. Cj 18-8004,
which set forth the elements of DUI in ldaho. If the provisions of the foreign law
"substantially conform" to the provisions of I.C. Cj 18-8004 (i.e., the elements of
DUI in the foreign state substantially conform to the elements of DUI in ldaho),
the foreign conviction is a "substantially conforming foreign criminal violation" as
a matter of law.
Review shows the provisions of the North Dakota DUI statute under which
Moore was convicted "substantially conform" to the elements of I.C. Cj 18-8004.
The North Dakota statute in effect at the time of Moore's DUI there provided:

A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of
any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to
which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state
if any of the following apply:
a.
That person has an alcohol concentration of at least
ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of a
chemical test within two hours after the driving or being in actual
physical control of a vehicle.
b.

That person is under the influence of intoxicating

liquor.
(State's Exhibit 5 (N.D.C.C. Cj 39-08-01).) The ldaho Code provided:
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of
alcohol ... or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined
in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of
his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street
or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a).
The elements of these crimes, as defined in the statutes, are
indistinguishable. See State v. Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 803, 172 P.3d 555, 558

(Ct. App. 2007) ("The legislature expressly provided that the focus of the
comparison should be on the elements of the statutes, and not the specific
conduct giving rise to the prior violation.") Both have as elements that the person
be "under the influence" of alcohol or intoxicating liquor, or that the person have a
certain percent of alcohol in his system; that the person "drive or be in actual
physical control" of a vehicle; and that the vehicle be on public property or private
property open to the public. The I.C. !j 18-8005(8) analysis of whether Moore
was determined to be guilty under the "law of another state

... substantially

conforming to the provisions of section 18-8004, ldaho Code," leads to the
inescapable conclusion that Moore is guilty of a felony. See Schmoll, 144 ldaho
at 804, 172 P.3d at 559 ("These two statutes frame their prohibitions using the
same language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain
a violation.").
In trying to avoid the inescapable, Moore varies from the analysis required
under I.C. § 18-8005(8) in two ways. First, he argues that to be substantially
conforming, the foreign DUI statute may never encompass conduct that would
not be made illegal in ldaho. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Second, he argues that
the Court should review how the foreign statute has been interpreted by the
courts of that state to determine if it is substantially conforming. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 10-14.) These propositions were expressly or implicitly rejected in
Schmoll.
Schmoll urged the court to hold that his Montana felony DUI conviction
could not enhance his ldaho DUI to a felony because his DUI in Montana, had it

been committed in Idaho, would have only been a misdemeanor. Schmoll, 144
ldaho at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 559-60 (rejecting Schmoll's request that the court
"adopt California's standard and method for using a foreign conviction for
enhancement purposes"). This standard was, however, rejected.

Id.

Instead,

the wurt held that "Idaho Code section 18-8005(8) expressly provides that the
comparison is between section 18-8004 and the foreign state statute that was
violated."

Id.at 805,

172 P.3d at 560 (emphasis added). Even assuming that

North Dakota courts have interpreted its DUI provisions more broadly, even
though the language is virtually identical to I.C. § 18-8004, such is irrelevant. A
comparison of the statutes, as required by I.C. § 18-8005(8), shows them to be at
least "substantially conforming."
The plain language of I.C.

5

18-8005(8) requires that the North Dakota

DUI statute and I.C. § 18-8004 be compared to determine if the two statutes are
substantially conforming. That comparison shows that they are, because they
have virtually identical elements expressed in the same or very similar language.
That North Dakota courts have interpreted that same language more broadly in
some specific instances is irrelevant, and also fails to show that the statutes are
not substantially conforming.
D.

Moore Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Of His Prior Conviction In
North Dakota Was Insufficient
Moore also argues that the state had the burden of proving that his waiver

of counsel in North Dakota was knowing and voluntary. (Appellant's brief, pp.
15-18.) This argument is contrary to existing law.

The state bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the validity
of the prior convictions. State v. Coby, 128 ldaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764
(1996); State v. Miller, 131 ldaho 288, 294, 955 P.2d 603, 609 (Ct. App 1997).
When collaterally attacking an uncounseled prior conviction, "it is the defendant's
burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the
assistance of counsel." Tovar v. Iowa, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004).~Moore's claim
that the state had the burden of proof is wrong. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.)
Because Moore had the burden of proving that his uncounseled guilty plea
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and because he presented no
evidence that his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel were violated, he has failed
to show that the evidence of his felony is deficient.
II.
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Admittinct State's Exhibit Four
A.

Introduction
During the second part of the trial, dealing with the enhancement to a

felony, the district court admitted State's Exhibit 4, which is a packet of three
documents obtained from the North Dakota courts. (State's Exhibit 4; Tr., p. 162,
L. 16 - p. 163, L. 20,; p. 171, L. 22 - p. 172, L. 11.) Moore objected to admission
of State's Exhibit 4, asserting that the judgment on page one had not been
specifically certified, and that the arrest warrant for a probation violation on page

Moore specifically cites Tovar for propositions other than the burden of proof,
but fails to note that it is directly contrary to his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp.
15-17.)

three was irrelevant. (Tr., p. 203, Ls. 12-18.) The district court overruled the
objections, finding the judgment admissible and admitting the third page (the
warrant) with an instruction that it was for the limited purpose of showing a
conviction. (Tr., p. 204, L. 2 - p. 205, L. 6.)
On appeal Moore again argues that the judgment was not properly
certified. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-20.) He also argues that the warrant was
irrelevant and unduly prejudiciaL4 (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-24.) Application of
the relevant law to the Exhibit shows that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding it adequately authenticated.
B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion.
State v. Howard, 135 ldaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v.
Zimmerman, 121 ldaho 971, 974,829 P.2d 861 (1992). Relevance of evidence,
however, is reviewed de novo. State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d
966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 ldaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997);
State v. McDonald, 131 ldaho 367,956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Admittina Paqe One Of State's Exhibit
Four, The Judament Of Conviction
State's exhibit four consists of a judgment of conviction, a charging

document, and a warrant for a probation violation. (State's Exhibit 4.) Only the

second page of the exhibit, the charging document, bears a certification on it.
(State's Exhibit 4.) The prosecutor represented that the exhibit was what he "had
from North Dakota," that the middle page (the charging document) bore the
certification, and that the documents all bear the same case number. (Tr., p.
163, Ls. 2-25.) The prosecutor also represented that they had received all three
pages "in a single envelope together."

(Tr., p. 172, Ls. 5-1 1.)

When the

prosecution moved to admit the exhibit defense counsel objected on the grounds
that "there is no state seal on the conviction itself." (Tr., p. 203, Ls. 15-16.) The
court overruled the objection. (Tr., p. 204, Ls. 2-3.)
On appeal Moore raises the same objection, contending that the judgment
was not admissible because there was no certification on that document.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-20.) While Moore is correct that there is no certification
on the judgment itself, and it is therefore not self-authenticating under I.R.E. 902,
such does not show that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it.
Questions of admissibilrty of evidence are questions for the court and may
be decided on the basis of otherwise inadmissible evidence.

I.R.E. 104(a).

ldaho Rule of Evidence 901 governs the foundational requirements for
documentary evidence and states, in relevant part:

"The requirement of

authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims." Illustrations (without limitation) of what the court may

Whether the document was unduly prejudicial was not an issue raised below
(Tr., p. 203, Ls. 10-22), and is therefore not preserved for appeal. State v.
Cannady, 137 ldaho 67,44 P.3d 1122 (2002).

take into consideration when making this determination include the court's
comparison with specimens that have been authenticated, I.R.E. 901(b)(3); the
"[alppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics" of the evidence, I.R.E. 901(b)(4); and "[elvidence that ... a
purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is
from the public office where items of this nature are kept," I.R.E. 901(b)(8).
The district court was entitled to make comparisons between the judgment
and the authenticated charging document.

I.R.E. 901(b)(3).

The charging

document bore a case number and name which corresponded to the case
number and name on the judgment.

The charge listed on the judgment

corresponded to the statute number on the charging document. The court was
also allowed to consider the appearance, contents and characteristics of the
challenged document in determining its authenticity.

I.R.E. 901(b)(3).

The

judgment has the appearance of a judgment, with all the relevant characteristics
including the heading, a judge's purported signature, and a filing stamp. Finally,
the court may consider the origins of the document. I.R.E. 901(b)(8). As noted
above, the prosecutor represented that he had received all three documents
(including the certified charging document) as part of a package from North
Dakota. Finally, there was no evidence that the document was not a judgment of
conviction from North Dakota.
Given the totality of the circumstances before the trial court, it did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that the copy of the judgment was what it
purported to be. Moore has failed to show error in the district court's ruling.

D.

The District Court Did Not Err In Deemins The Probation Violation Warrant
Relevant To Whether Moore Had Been Convicted Of DUI In North Dakota
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401.

Unless

otherwise excludable by the rules of evidence, relevant evidence is admissible.
I.R.E. 402.
Page three of State's Exhibit 4 bears the following information on its face:
Moore's name, date of birth and social security number; case number 18-98-K03689 from the "District Court, Grand Forks County, North Dakota Northeast
Central Judicial District; and a statement that Moore was "convicted of the
crime(s) of DROVE OR IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF MN." (State's
Exhibit 4.) Comparison with the charging document on page 2 of that same
exhibit (the admission of which Moore does not challenge on appeal) reveals the
following parallels: the same name, date of birth and social security number; a
stamp bearing a number that is the same or at least very similar to the case
number that appears on the warrant (98 K- 3689); the county and city of "G.F."
and the same charge as listed as a conviction. (State's Exhibit 4.)
Whether Moore was convicted in North Dakota of DUI was an issue in this
case. The warrant explicitly states that someone with the same name, social
security number and date of birth as the defendant was convicted of the crime of
driving or actual physical control of a motor vehicle, a crime that is described with
a primary element of DUI. The warrant thus has the tendency to make the fact of

a prior conviction for DUI more probable than without this evidence. Moore has
failed to show that the warrant was irrelevant to any issues at trial.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Moore's conviction for
felony DUE.
DATED this 9th day of Septe
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